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Ten years ago, upon accession to the WTO, China committed to a seriesof specific obligations often referred to as “WTO+,” aimed at the pro-gressive transformation of the Chinese legal landscape towards (2) if
not a genuine rule of law in the democratic sense of the concept, at least a
sui generis model that could result from a greater porosity between the
legal order and practices. In the China Perspectives special issue published
at that time, I questioned what I had identified as a possible “rule of law by
internationalisation” – that is, China’s greater attention to of international
rules and the positive impact this new familiarity might have on internal
reform. From legal drafting to legal implementation and the role of the ju-
diciary in adjudicating disputes, Chinese law, while rapidly reforming, was
already confronted with a series of essential limitations. The unique and rig-
orous character of the Chinese Protocol of accession to the WTO as well as
the planned far-reaching legal reforms were nevertheless raised hopes for
change, as if this receptivity of the national legal order to international law
was giving a helping hand to the Chinese transformation into a rule-led and
rule-abiding regime. (3) While one cannot ignore a number of very significant
achievements as well as a true political responsiveness to other WTO Mem-
bers’ concerns, (4) China has not been willing to grasp the WTO opportunity
for domestic legal reforms as much as some observers, and also some Chi-
nese leaders, had hoped for. This incomplete transformation does not only
create tensions between WTO Members, as evidenced by an increasing
number of disputes shedding a direct light on the lack of transparency in
the Chinese legal regime, but could also impede fundamental socio-eco-
nomic evolutions.
After a decade of China’s participation in the WTO, this piece reflects upon
my own initial findings and predictions, while putting Chinese legal reform
into a broader political perspective.
Incomplete transformation
China’s initial commitments
From July 1986 to November 2001, China traversed a 15-year diplomatic
marathon that ended, at the WTO Ministerial Conference of Doha, with the
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1. Extract from a letter to President Clinton on 14 November 1999, right after the US-China bilateral
Agreement on WTO accession was signed. Available on  the web site of the US-China Business
Council at www.uschina.org/public/wto (consulted on 25 February 2012).
2. See generally Protocol of Accession of the Republic of China to the WTO (WT/L/432), 10 Novem-
ber 2001, and the incorporated paragraphs of its Working Party Report (WT/ACC/CHN/49).
3. For a more detailed account, see Leïla Choukroune, “China’s Accession to the WTO and Legal Re-
form: Towards the Rule of Law via Internationalization without Democracy,” in Pierre-Etienne Will
and Mireille Delmas-Marty (eds.), China, Democracy and Law, Leiden, Brill, 2012; as well as Leïla
Choukroune, “China’s accession to the WTO: A Turning Point,” and, “A Rule of Law through Inter-
nationalization, the Objective of the Reforms,” China Perspectives, no. 40, March-April 2002.
4. As shown by the bilateral trade dialogues between China and its main trading partners and as re-
flected in the Transitional Review Mechanism’s Reports, as well as in the China Trade Policy Review:
USTR, 2011 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, Trade Policy Review: Report by the
Secretariat – China (Revision), WT/TPR/S/230/Rev. 1, 5 July 2010, and China’s Transitional Review
Mechanism; Communication from the European Communities, G/MA/W/97, 22 September 2009.
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“The participation of China in the WTO would not only have economic and political benefits, but would also serve to bolster those in China who
understand that the country must embrace the rule of law.”
Martin Lee, leader of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong. (1)
signing of a Protocol of Accession more than 900 pages long. The American
and European insistence on integrating “rule of law”-related requirements in
the Chinese Protocol should be put into a historical perspective. While the
first phase of negotiations commenced in early 1987, it was abruptly termi-
nated in the immediate aftermath of “Beijing Spring” and the bloody political
repression that followed. Reversing into a protectionist strategy, China re-
stored a series of administrative measures to control its foreign trade. By
1992 and the adoption of the “socialist market economy” doctrine at the
14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing found a way to rec-
oncile political and economic objectives and embrace a new period of pow-
erful growth able to restore its international credibility. Hoping to join the
WTO before the Uruguay Round negotiations were brought to a close, China
was determined to reform and accept its trading partners’ requirements. A
draft Protocol of Accession had been prepared and presented by the Euro-
pean Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, to Wu Yi, China’s then Minister of For-
eign Trade, during a visit to Beijing on 28February 1994. But from May 1994,
the negotiations stumbled over the question of intellectual property and the
serious doubt raised by the US over China’s ability to implement its com-
mitments in the context of what remained an immature legal system. The
issue of a state governed by law, not to say the rule of law, was touched upon
directly by the ambitious draft Protocol for the “reintegration” of China into
the GATT, as it already formulated for a whole series of provisions addressing
the questions of transparency and judicial review of administrative acts re-
lating to international trade. China was not ready, and revised its strategy to
adopt a gradual approach: from March 1996, when China’s Vice-Minister of
Foreign Trade and chief negotiator, Long Yongtu, took part in the first session
of the Working Party on the Accession of China to the WTO, a diplomatic
ballet began between Beijing and Washington, and between Beijing and Brus-
sels. China and the US reached a crucial compromise in November 1999,
while China and the EU concluded their negotiations positively a few months
later in May 2000. Interestingly, the issue of administration of the trade
regime in a uniform and transparent manner, as well as possible judicial re-
view of the related administrative measures – and so a certain rule of law –
had always been at the centre of the discussions.
Catch-all and flexible concepts, the principles of uniform application and
transparency in international and/or national law build upon the ideas of
openness and predictability to generate legal certainty for all, and businesses
in particular. In a WTO context, uniform application and transparency are
applied to all agreements and cover a large number of trade aspects, from
technical barriers to trade to sanitary and phytosanitary measures or sub-
sidies. (5) They guarantee the effectiveness of a reciprocal system relying on
the principle of non-discrimination embodied in the concepts of Most Fa-
vored Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT). Informing other WTO
Members of one's legal provisions and practices and having these norms re-
viewed by an independent judicial system is proof of genuine adherence to
the rules and effective participation in the liberalisation of international
trade.
In a Chinese context, these apparently inoffensive requirements echo with
a rather peculiar sound. Closed to the world for decades, the Chinese polit-
ical-legal system was generally not keen to embrace the concepts of trans-
parency or independent judicial review of administrative acts, (6) as they
were likely to challenge its functioning at the national and local levels. On
the other hand, some Chinese reformers, starting with Zhu Rongji, were
happy to consider China’s increased international assertiveness as a tool to
speed up complicated internal reforms. The results of these tensions and
negotiations can be found in Part I, Section II, paragraphs A, B, C, and D of
the Chinese Protocol of Accession to the WTO that deals with the admin-
istration of the trade regime and should to be read in conjunction with Ar-
ticle X (Publication and Administration of trade Regulations) of GATT 1994
(see Document 1). 
For China, which had no Official Journal upon accession to the WTO, a
fragmented legal regime, and a judicial system that was not exactly known
for its impartiality and independence, this particular aspect of the WTO Pro-
tocol of Accession soon appeared as a considerable challenge.
Achievements
Ten years after the adoption of these provisions, one cannot ignore the
progress made towards the realisation of a more transparent and uniform
trade regime.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC – now MOFCOM), more than 2,500 commercial laws and regu-
lations were assessed in May 2002, 830 of which were abrogated and 325
amended, while the National People's Congress undertook to draft 118 new
laws and regulations. (8) The reform process continued at the central and
local levels. Hundreds of trade-related laws and regulations were modified
or abrogated to meet the new WTO commitments. In doing so, the Chinese
government also worked on implementation of the “rule of law” require-
ments encompassed in its Protocol of Accession.
On the transparency front to start with, progress has been slow, but some
objectives have been reached. Following its accession to the WTO, China
did not establish or designate an Official Journal as required by its Protocol
of Accession. It relied on a variety of channels, from websites to journals
and news reports, to inform its trading partners of the trade-related meas-
ures adopted at the central or local levels. One had to wait until 2006 to
see the State Council issue a notice to all government entities and requiring
the competent authorities to send a copy of the trade-related measures
they adopted to the MOFCOM for publication in the MOFCOM Gazette.
As one might expect, adherence to this publication rule is far from complete
and constitutes one of the main criticisms regularly formulated by foreign
businesses operating in China. (9) Another source of frustration relates to the
Chinese failure to make available the mandatory translations into one or
more of the WTO official languages (English, French, and Spanish) of its
trade-related laws and regulations before enforcement of these rules and
in any case no later than 90 days afterwards. Ten years after China’s acces-
sion to the WTO, businesses and trade lawyers continue to produce their
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5. See for example GATT 1994 Article X, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement Articles 2,
3, 5, 7, 8, and 9, Part VII of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, GATS
Article III, TRIPs Article 63, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS) Agreement Article 7 and Annex B, Agreement on Safeguards, Article 12 and Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Article 6.
6. Made possible with the adoption of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of
China – also known as the Administrative Procedure Law – in 1989. See www.china.org.cn/eng-
lish/government/207335.htm (consulted on 15 March 2012).
7. Highlighted in bold by the author.
8. See MOFTEC and United States Trade Representative, 2002 Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance, 11 December 2002.
9. See, for instance, the excellent informative survey by the European Chamber of Commerce in
China, Europe Business in China, Business Confidence Survey 2011, available at: www.european
chamber.com.cn/view/media/publications (consulted on 25 February 2012). This study is based
on a panel of EU representative companies surveyed in 2011. See also the USTR report and the
WTO reports published for China’s trade policy review and transitional review mechanism, supra
footnote 4.
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Administration of the Trade Regime
(A) Uniform Administration
1. The provisions of the WTO Agreement and this Protocol shall apply to the entire customs territory of China,7 including border trade regions
and minority autonomous areas, Special Economic Zones, open coastal cities, economic and technical development zones and other areas
where special regimes for tariffs, taxes and regulations are established (collectively referred to as “special economic areas”).
2. China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures of the central
government as well as local regulations, rules and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level (collectively referred to as “laws,
regulations and other measures”) pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(“TRIPS”) or the control of foreign exchange.
3. China’s local regulations, rules and other measures of local governments at the sub-national level shall conform to the obligations undertaken
in the WTO Agreement and this Protocol.
4. China shall establish a mechanism under which individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national authorities cases of
non-uniform application of the trade regime.
(B) Special Economic Areas
1. China shall notify to the WTO all the relevant laws, regulations and other measures relating to its special economic areas, listing these areas
by name and indicating the geographic boundaries that define them. China shall notify the WTO promptly, but in any case within 60 days, of
any additions or modifications to its special economic areas, including notification of the laws, regulations and other measures relating thereto.
2. China shall apply to imported products, including physically incorporated components, introduced into the other parts of China’s customs
territory from the special economic areas, all taxes, charges and measures affecting imports, including import restrictions and customs and
tariff charges, that are normally applied to imports into the other parts of China’s customs territory.
3. Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, in providing preferential arrangements for enterprises within such special economic areas,
WTO provisions on non-discrimination and national treatment shall be fully observed.
(C) Transparency
1. China undertakes that only those laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the
control of foreign exchange that are published and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises, shall be enforced.
In addition, China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting
trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such measures are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations,
laws, regulations and other measures shall be made available at the latest when they are implemented or enforced.
2. China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to the publication of all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining
to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange and, after publication of its laws, regulations or other
measures in such journal, shall provide a reasonable period for comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures are im-
plemented, except for those laws, regulations and other measures involving national security, specific measures setting foreign exchange
rates or monetary policy and other measures the publication of which would impede law enforcement. China shall publish this journal
on a regular basis and make copies of all issues of this journal readily available to individuals and enterprises.
3. China shall establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO Member all information
relating to the measures required to be published under paragraph 2(C)1 of this Protocol may be obtained. Replies to requests for infor-
mation shall generally be provided within 30 days after receipt of a request. In exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45 days
after receipt of a request. Notice of the delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in writing to the interested party. Replies to WTO
Members shall be complete and shall represent the authoritative view of the Chinese government. Accurate and reliable information shall
be provided to individuals and enterprises.
(D) Judicial Review
1. China shall establish, or designate, and maintain tribunals, contact points and procedures for the prompt review of all administrative actions
relating to the implementation of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application referred to in Article X:1
of the GATT 1994, Article VI of the GATS and the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Such tribunals shall be impartial and independent
of the agency entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter.
2. Review procedures shall include the opportunity for appeal, without penalty, by individuals or enterprises affected by any administrative
action subject to review. If the initial right of appeal is to an administrative body, there shall in all cases be the opportunity to choose to
appeal the decision to a judicial body. Notice of the decision on appeal shall be given to the appellant and the reasons for such decision shall
be provided in writing. The appellant shall also be informed of any right to further appeal.  
Document 1 – China Protocol of Accession to the WTO, Part I, Section 2
own translations of available rules. (10) As we will see below, this is not a triv-
ial detail, as the US recently claimed in the China — Measures concerning
wind power equipment (DS 419) (11) case that this failure to translate rele-
vant trade measures constituted a clear violation of the Chinese Accession
Protocol. However, a more satisfactory evolution has taken place in relation
to the ability to publicly comment on trade-related laws and regulations.
From late 2003 and the adoption by MOFCOM of its Provisional Regulations
on Administrative Transparency, the Trade Ministry started to accept more
comments and reactions to the rules it was adopting. The application of
these Regulations has nevertheless been very uneven, and Chinese trading
partners have kept pushing for more transparency in providing, for instance,
myriad technical assistance programmes for Chinese officials (see document
2). In 2010, the State Council’s Opinions on the Strengthening of the build-
ing of a government ruled by law aimed at reinforcing the public comment
system at all levels of government, but again, implementation of this meas-
ure seems rather limited. On a more positive note, China’s trading partners
generally agree on the progresses made in terms of the professionalism and
responsiveness of the Chinese administration. (12) The MOFCOM Enquiry and
Notification Centre seems to be functionning well, along with other desig-
nated enquiry points. China has also benefited from a wide range of inter-
national programmes designed to help it fulfil its commitments under the
WTO Agreement (see Focus: Aid for Trade).
A more complicated situation is found when assessing the uniform appli-
cation of China’s trade-related laws and regulations. Despite MOFCOM com-
mitments, many problems persist in the areas of investment, intellectual
property, customs, and taxation and constitute de facto barriers to trade. (13)
An equally complex and unsatisfactory observation can be made in rela-
tion to the absence of a judicial review system of administrative acts related
to trade issues. Although some progress has been made in the reform of ad-
ministrative law, Chinese courts still suffer from a lack of professionalism
and independence originating in the historical and recent limitations the
Chinese government has put on the legal reform. Introduced into the law
school curriculum in 1981 but made mandatory only in 1986, Chinese ad-
ministrative law is recent and in constant evolution. The principal piece of
legislation governing the possible judicial review of administrative acts is
the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (“ALL”).
The ALL stipulates that citizens or other legal persons (in this case, compa-
nies) whose rights have been infringed upon by certain types of adminis-
trative acts are able to seek remedies in bringing the case to Chinese courts.
Citizens’ ability to resort to this type of justice should not be exaggerated,
as only 2 percent of the six million cases heard by Chinese courts in 2003
concerned a dispute between a citizen and an administration. While the
very large majority of Chinese laws could fall under the category of admin-
istrative law, this could, at first sight, seem very surprising. A simple expla-
nation can however rapidly be found, that of the quasi-systematic
interference of administrative agencies or the Chinese Communist Party it-
10. Ibid.
11. See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm (consulted on 25 February
2012).
12. See the article of Hubert Bazin in this special issue.
13. For a detailed overview of these trade barriers, see EU-China Trade Relations, a study coordinated
by Leïla Choukroune and authored by Denise Prevost, Jean-François Huchet, Rogier Creemers, and
Leila Choukroune for the European Parliament Directorate General for External Policies, Policy
Department, presented at the EU Parliament on 11 October 2011: www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
web/Main/Sitewide/Content/IGIRFellowLeilaChoukrounePresentsStudyOnEUChinaTradeRelation
sToEuropeanParliament.htm (consulted on 15 March 2012).
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According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),
China received USD 6.7 billion in bilateral and multilateral de-
velopment assistance between January 1979 and May 2009.
This assistance has clearly been beneficial to Chinese growth. 
As far as trade is concerned, the OECD estimates that commit-
ments made by developed nations for development assistance
to China amounted to USD 1.4 billion in 2007. This included
USD 335 million in aid for trade and assisting China in imple-
menting its WTO commitments.*
The EU has committed to very large, long-term programmes of
trade assistance for China. The most important was the Euro
20.6 million jointly-funded EU China Trade Project that ended
in December 2009 and consisted of more than 300 technical
assistance and training activities designed primarily to support
China’s application of its WTO commitments. This supported
regulatory and legislative efforts and specifically targeted: the
customs and import/export regulatory system, agriculture and
agro-food, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosan-
itary measures, trade in services, legislative and legal aspects of
domestic implementation, and transparency, co-operation, and
policy development.
Over the course of the Project, 50 Chinese government officials
from both the central and provincial levels attended training
courses in European Institutions, and 250 Chinese officials par-
ticipated in study visits to Europe, while EU counterparts visited
China. More than 1,000 officials were trained either in Europe
or internationally.** The main achievement of this programme
was certainly the adoption of the long-awaited China antimo-
nopoly law, which is largely inspired by European norms and
practices. The impact on transparency and rule of law is more
doubtful.
In terms of further cooperation, the EU China Country Strategy
Paper (2007-2013) sets out three main areas:
1. Bilateral trade, business, socio-economic development, sup-
port for the internal reform process;
2. Climate change, the environment and energy;
3. Human resources development.
Euro 128 million have been allocated for the first four years
(2007-2010).***
This, of course, is not to mention many other smaller EU proj-
ects, as well as specific activities by EU member countries or EU
regions. France, for instance, has developed a quite comprehen-
sive programme of legal and judicial training.****
L. C.
* These figures are reported in the China 2010 WTO Trade Policy Review
(WT/TRR/S/230/Rev.1), 5 July 2010, p. 22.
** See http://www.euchinawto.org.
*** See www.eeas.europa.eu/china/csp/07_13_en.pdf.
**** See www.ambafrancecn.org/imprimer.html?id_article=
388&lang=fr&cs=print.
Focus: Aid for Trade
12 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 1
self to discourage Chinese citizens from resorting to the courts, and if they
do, to make sure that the judge will not accept the case or will abandon
the procedure at a later stage. (14) To encourage a genuine application of the
Chinese Protocol of Accession, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) promul-
gated in August 2002 a judicial interpretation requiring judicial review of
WTO-related administrative acts to be based on the ALL and to be adjudi-
cated at least by the administrative division of the intermediate courts if
not a higher court. In November of the same year, the SPC promulgated
two other judicial interpretations prescribing that antidumping and coun-
tervailing related cases should be heard at the (provincial) High People’s
Court level. Despite these promising first steps, little data seems available
from businesses so far regarding the effective functioning of these WTO-
related courts, and it remains to be seen whether China is willing to imple-
ment this particular aspect of its Protocol of Accession.
From a distance, everything appears as if China were abiding by the
rules and progressively moving towards a rule-led type of government
while benefiting from a greater familiarity with international norms.
However, a closer look at the Chinese legal landscape helps us rapidly
identify many limitations and their causes.
The compromised “rule of law by internationalisation” 
As illustrated by the above discussion, it seems one may have to wait even
longer to make the Chinese “administration accountable to the people” (min
gao guan 民告官). (15) While China’s accession to the WTO has gone beyond
simple harmonisation and has contributed to a more ambitious legal reform,
hence bringing a new legal framework via internationalisation, this porosity
of legal orders and the greater reception of rules that followed has not yet
brought anything close to the rule of law. The structural and political reasons
explaining this unachieved transformation would require a much more de-
tailed explanation than the scope of this piece allows, but we can never-
theless provide a few key elements relating to the legal profession and
pointing out the many legal deadlocks in which Chinese legal reform has
gotten stuck during the past few years.
Legal impasses
One key element of this inherent limitation and the inability of China to
truly adhere to its “rule of law”-related commitments lies in the lack of a
professional and independent judiciary. During the first legal reform phase,
the courts were reorganised according to a four-tier hierarchy, with the
Supreme People’s Court (Zuigao renmin fayuan 最高人民法院) at the top. (16)
There are 3,000 Basic People’s Courts with approximately 200,000 judges.
Their level of professionalism was enhanced considerably in 2002 with the
establishment of the standard national examination, which has a success rate
of around 10 percent. The vast majority of practising judges nevertheless had
no real legal training. There is obviously a huge difference between a judge in
the Supreme People’s Court who is well aware of international realities and
of belonging to a legal community able to interpret the law, and a judge drawn
from the ranks of the army or the police, appointed by a local People’s con-
gress, and continually confronting problems of legitimacy vis-a-vis Party of-
ficials, as well as lacking resources and tempted by corruption. (17)
In 1999, the Supreme People’s Court adopted a first five-year reform plan
aimed at enhancing the professionalism and independence of judges. (18) On
18 October 2001, the Court published a code of ethics, targeting in partic-
ular judicial corruption. (19) Finally, in October 2005, the Court unveiled its
second five-year plan (2006-2010), one highlight of which was to imple-
ment a process of centralised national review of capital punishment sen-
tences. (20) Despite the commendable efforts of a Supreme Court made more
dynamic through the profile of Xiao Yang as its President, the Party’s inter-
ference remains too strong for the acclaimed modernisation to have real
effect. (21) This was cynically confirmed with the election, on 16 March 2008,
of Wang Shengjun as the New President of the Supreme Court. (22) Upon
this change of leadership, the Supreme Court has modified its discourse to
the great confusion and dissatisfaction of the many “modern” judges who
were looking forward to the professionalisation of the judiciary and eventual
independence from the Party-state.
This return to the past has brought not only disappointment amongst the
legal profession, but also real worries as to the future of an already quite
uncertain judicial reform. Clearly all this is a question of judicial independ-
ence. But how is this independence to be assessed, and what type of
progress can be made in terms of fairness while there is no institution equiv-
alent to a “high council for the judiciary,” for example, and no guarantee of
the independence or impartiality of the judiciary under any statute? More
specifically, the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo seems to be THE
body in charge of justice, through the establishment of a leading small group
on judicial reform (sifa tizhi jizhi gaige lingdao xiaozu 司法體制機 制改革領
導小組). Through this group and the Party’s Political and Legal Committees
and its Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the entire judicial ap-
paratus (prosecution, judges, ministry, and even the police) is subject to the
Party, which of course cannot be legally challenged.
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14. See Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China,”
The China Journal, no. 51, 2004, pp. 75-96; and for a more detailed account of the administrative
reform, Leïla Choukroune, “China’s Accession to the WTO and Legal Reform: Towards the Rule of
Law via Internationalization without Democracy,” art. cit.
15. For a fascinating discussion of the administrative reforms taken upon accession to the WTO and
that could have led to an effective judicial review of trade-related administrative acts, see Veron
Mei-Ying Hung, “China’s Commitment on Independent Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Po-
litical Reform,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 52, 2004, pp. 77-132.
16. There are three other levels: 30 High People’s Courts (Gaoji renmin fayuan 高級人民法院), which
have authority in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central
government; 389 Intermediate People’s Courts (Zhongji renmin fayuan 中級人民法院), which
function at the prefecture level, with municipalities served by courts at the level of provinces and
autonomous regions; and, finally, more than 3,000 Basic People’s Courts (Jiceng renmin fayuan
基層人民法院), which have authority at the district and county level, and that are sometimes
complemented by other People’s Tribunals (Renmin fating 人民法庭) in the instance of those
counties that are geographically dispersed. Furthermore, there are more than 100 specific tribunals
with authority in matters of fishing, maritime affairs, forestry, railways, etc.
17. For a precise and rigorous history of the last 30 years of judicial reform, see Stanley Lubman, Bird
in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. Although
more than ten years old now, this book remains a classic, as not much has changed in a positive
way as far as the judiciary is concerned.
18. Cf. Renmin Fayuan wunian gaige gangyao (Five-Year Program of Reform), www.dffy.com/faguix
iazai/xf/200511/20051128111114.htm (consulted on 15 March 2012).
19. See Li Yuwen, “Professional Ethics of Chinese Judges, A Rising Issue in the Landscape of Judicial
Practice,” China Perspectives, no. 47, May-June 2003, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/docu
ment274.html (consulted on 15 March 2012).
20. See Renmin Fayuan dierge wunian gaige gangyao (Second Five-Year Program of Reform),
www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200512/20051214221735.htm (consulted on 15 March 2012).
21. See Benjamin Liebman, “China’s Courts: Restricted Reform,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Fall
2007, and by the same author, “A Populist Threat to China’s Courts,” in Mary Gallagher & Margaret
Woo (eds.), Chinese Justice: Civil dispute resolution in post-reform China, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
22. With no formal legal education, this native of Suzhou joined the Chinese Communist Party in
1972 and occupied various prestigious positions in the local communist apparatus until he be-
came, in 1993, deputy secretary general of the Party Central Politics and Law Committee. Wang
Shengjun was also deputy director of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of
Public Security from 2005 to 2008 and a member of 15th Party Central Commission for Discipline
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Leïla Choukroune – The Compromised “Rule of Law by Internationalisation”
Another severe limitation to WTO-related “rule of law” ambitions lies in the
frequent and arbitrary repression of rights defenders and the systematic pro-
motion of mediation as the best alternative to judicial settlement. As too
often demonstrated in the recent news, the professional work of lawyers re-
ceives insufficient protection. The very recent amendments to the Chinese
Criminal Procedure Law will not bring more certainty in this regard, but rather
put lawyers at risk if they are too independent and critical of the government.
These developments go against commendable efforts to modernise and
promote a Chinese legal system that was opening up increasingly to exter-
nal influences. The restoration of norms, which is occurring through legisla-
tive and procedural make-believe, hides an ambiguous attitude towards the
law and only brings about an illusion of justice based on the fiction of har-
mony and the need to discipline a society to better ensure its stability.
Coming battles
These limitations empasses will not be without effect at the WTO level,
as we now see an increasing number of disputes dealing with the issue of
transparency, or more precisely the lack of transparency and accountability
of the Chinese legal system. Three of the 23 disputes brought against China
deserve particular attention: China — Measures Related to the Exportation
of Various Raw Materials (US, EU, and Mexico as complainants), (23) China
— Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment (US as complainant), (24)
China — Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fas-
teners from the European Union (EU as complainant). (25) With very little in
common from a substantive point of view, these disputes nevertheless share
a common approach in the sense that the opacity of the Chinese regula-
tory landscape appears as a de facto barrier to trade and a clear violation
of the Chinese Protocol of Accession. China’s reluctance to publish its
laws and regulations and notify the WTO of the latest transformation of
its trade regime will soon become a major issue, as evidenced by a grow-
ing number of cases addressing this problem.
Conclusion
The syncretic nature of China’s legal system no longer evokes surprise. Al-
though drawn from foreign rules and practices, China has sinicised these
norms to better integrate them. China’s accession to and participation in
the WTO is a fascinating illustration of this ability to adapt and perpetuate
a given system without fundamentally challenging its basis. While Chinese
legal reform has clearly benefited from the WTO engine, the changes in
leadership witnessed since the mid-2000s have not led to the “rule of law
via internationalisation” some Chinese rulers were themselves calling for.
As discussed above, this incomplete transformation originates in the limits
of Chinese law itself, from law-making to law implementation, and creates
tensions between WTO Members as evidenced by an increasing number of
disputes directly pinpointing the lack of transparency of the Chinese legal
regime.
A diligent student of international trade law, which plays with interna-
tional norms and seemingly abides by them, China has not been able to
overcome the serious contradictions that have not only hindered a genuine
political evolution, but have also taken legal reform backward, by favouring
stability over change. It is to be hoped a different political elite may soon
be able to approach legal and political reform in a less fragmented and
hence more coherent way that could bring about the long-awaited trans-
formations.
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